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Abstract Can an international organization socialize those who work within it?
The European Commission of the European Union is a crucial case because it is an
autonomous international organization with a vocation to defend supranational norms+
If this body cannot socialize its members, which international organization can? I
develop theoretical expectations about how time, organizational structure, alterna-
tive processes of preference formation, and national socialization affect international
socialization+ To test these expectations for the European Commission, I use two
surveys of top permanent Commission officials, conducted in 1996 and 2002+ The
analysis shows that support for supranational norms is relatively high, but that this is
more because of national socialization than socialization in the Commission+ National
norms, originating in prior experiences in national ministries, loyalty to national polit-
ical parties, or experience with one’s country’s organization of authority, decisively
shape top officials’ views on supranational norms+ There are, then, several roads to
international norms+
To what extent can an international organization socialize those who work within
it? In order for international institutions in Europe to socialize states and state
agents into international norms, they must themselves emanate these norms+ But
can one simply presume that the people who work within international organiza-
tions share international norms, and if so, what are the causal mechanisms?
The Commission of the European Union ~hereafter the European Commission!
is a crucial case for examining socialization within an international organization+
For comments and advice, I am grateful to Jeffrey Checkel, Gary Marks, Donald Searing, and the
editors and two anonymous reviewers for International Organization+An earlier draft was presented at
the Center for European Studies of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill+ This project received
funding from the Center for European Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and from
two grants by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council ~1996–99, 1999–2002!+
Gina Cosentino, Erica Edwards, Michael Harvey, and Moira Nelson provided research assistance+
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Crucial cases “offer valuable tests because they are strongly expected to confirm
or disconfirm prior hypotheses+” 1 Compared with other international organiza-
tions in Europe, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ~NATO! or the
Council of Europe, the European Commission is extraordinarily autonomous and
powerful, and this, socialization theory predicts, should make it the most likely
site for socialization+ The European Commission is the steering body of the world’s
most encompassing supranational regime+ It has a vocation to identify and defend
the European interest over and above—and if need be, against—particular national
interests+ It is the agenda setter in the European Union ~EU!+ It also has the author-
ity to select and groom its employees with minimal national interference+ So there
are strong reasons to expect international socialization to be effective in the Euro-
pean Commission+ If this powerful body cannot shape its employees’ preferences,
which international organization can?
How can one make sense of top Commission officials’ support for, or opposi-
tion to, the European Commission’s core norms? Support in itself does not, of
course, mean that officials have been socialized in the Commission+ What are the
scope conditions for international socialization? When does international social-
ization work, and when does it not? When do alternative processes of preference
formation predominate? Can international officials learn international norms out-
side the international organization?
In this article, I set out a theory of preference formation in international orga-
nizations+ I frame expectations concerning when international socialization may
work, what shape it may take, and when it may be trumped by other processes or
contexts+ In the language of this special issue, I am concerned with specifying
the scope conditions of international socialization+ I build primarily on work in
comparative and U+S+ politics and political psychology, as well as recent work
on socialization in international organizations, to develop a theory applicable in
international contexts+ The first section describes the European Commission and
the norms it embodies+ I then lay out hypotheses about when, how, where, and
to what extent international socialization works+ Finally, I evaluate the validity
of these hypotheses against evidence from two surveys of senior Commission
officials+
My conclusion is that, while support for international norms is high, this is not
primarily because of socialization in the European Commission+ Top officials sus-
tain Commission norms when national experiences motivate them to do so—when
national political socialization predisposes them to embrace supranationalism, or
when supranationalism appears to benefit their country+ Like Beyers’ national
bureaucrats in EU Council working groups,2 these quintessentially European bureau-
crats take their cues primarily from their national environment+ Several roads lead
to Commission norms, but few run through international socialization+
1+ See McKeown 2004, 141; and Eckstein 1975+
2+ Beyers, this volume+
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The Engine of Europe
The role of the European Commission is described precisely in the Treaty of the
European Union and is reinforced by the Commission’s house rules+ The Commis-
sion has a constitutional obligation to set the legislative agenda in the European
Union ~EU!+3 Unique among international institutions and unparalleled among exec-
utives in national democracies, the Commission has exclusive formal competence
to initiate and draft EU legislation+4 It decides when regulation is necessary and
how it should be devised+ The Council of Ministers, which represents national
governments, and the European Parliament, which is directly elected, may request
the Commission to draft an initiative, but the Commission can, and sometimes
does, refuse+ The Treaty also instructs the Commission to serve the European inter-
est+5 It also requires the Commission to be independent from any national govern-
ment+6 These Treaty rules apply to the two levels of the European Commission:
the political College, composed of the twenty-five commissioners appointed jointly
for five years by member states and the European Parliament to give the Commis-
sion political guidance; and the Commission bureaucracy, consisting of approxi-
mately 24,000 permanent career civil servants selected through central European
exams to take care of daily business+
It is with the career civil servants, and more precisely the most senior officials
among them, that I am concerned+ They are the men and women who soldier on
as political Colleges—led by Delors, Santer, Prodi, or Barroso—come and go+ In
addition to being bound by the Treaty, they are expected to adhere to the Euro-
pean Commission’s internal staff regulations, which instruct that “an official shall
carry out his duties and conduct himself solely with the interests of the Commu-
nities in mind; he shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government,
authority, organisation or person outside his institution+ + + + He shall carry out the
duties assigned to him objectively, impartially and in keeping with his duty of
loyalty to the Communities+” 7
Constitutional rules and house rules create clear expectations—norms—that are
expressly designed to guide Commission officials, whether as political appointees
or as permanent career officials+ They prescribe the Commission and its employ-
ees to ~1! put the Union interest first ~supranationalism!,8 ~2! construe what this
3+ Article 211, Treaty of the European Union+
4+ This monopoly has grown with the steady expansion of the Treaty’s so-called pillar I from pri-
marily internal market issues to political regulation, and the transfer of some pillar II and III issues,
including aspects of asylum, immigration, and foreign policy, to pillar I+ At the same time, the Com-
mission’s monopoly has been eroded by informal rules that give the European Parliament and the
European Council certain rights to table initiatives+
5+ Article 213+2, Treaty of the European Union+
6+ Ibid+
7+ Article 11, Staff regulations of Officials of the European Communities ~May, 2004!+ Available
from http:00europe+eu+int0comm0dgs0personnel_administration, accessed on 23 August 2005+
8+ As Haas points out, supranationality is an elusive concept+ He defines supranationality as a hybrid
between federalism and intergovernmentalism, whereby more power is given to the central agency
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means proactively ~agenda setting!, and ~3! promote the Union interest indepen-
dently from national pressures ~impartiality and autonomy!+9
These norms have deep roots+ The Commission’s founding father, Jean Monnet,
saw the Commission as a small, organizationally flexible and adaptive, multi-
national nucleus of individuals at the European level, akin to the Planning Com-
mission ~Commissariat de plan! he had set up after World War II in France to
devise the first five-year national economic plan+ Liberated from national inter-
ests, its role was to develop ideas freely, to stimulate and persuade+ The Commis-
sion’s autonomy, pro-European bias, and exclusive power of initiative were crucial
to this conception, and Monnet persuaded national leaders to anchor these princi-
ples in the Treaty+ The notion that the European Commission is, and should be,
the engine of Europe was born+10 This notion is a direct challenge to Westphalian
state-centric norms in international relations+11 No other national or international
organization, with the exception of the European Court of Justice, represents so
patently the view that supranational interest is irreducible to national interests+
How widespread is support for these pro-European norms in the Commission
itself? Do the people who work in the Commission support supranationalism, Com-
mission agenda setting, and autonomy? Does this support arise because the Com-
mission socializes those who work in it?
Shaping Preferences in International Organizations
Most research on international socialization examines states or state governments
rather than individuals+12 In this analysis, I focus on individuals within an inter-
national organization+13
than is customary for conventional international organizations, but less than to a federal government+
See Haas 1958, 34; see also Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 14–21+ The defining feature of suprana-
tionalism is that decisions are binding on member states+ Supranationalism approaches federalism when
decisions are made by independent European organizations, such as the European Court, European
Parliament, or the European Commission+
9+ The draft constitutional treaty of the European Union, signed on 29 October 2004 by the mem-
bers of the European Council in Rome, restates these norms: ~1! Supranationalism: Article 25+1: “The
European Commission shall promote the general European interest and take appropriate initiatives to
that end+” ~2! Agenda setting: Article 25+2: “Except where the Constitution provides otherwise, Union
legislative acts can be adopted only on the basis of a Commission proposal+” ~3! Impartiality and
autonomy: Article 25+4: “In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely inde-
pendent+ In the discharge of their duties, the European Commissioners and the Commissioners shall
neither seek nor take instructions from any government or other body+” The treaty is available at ^http:00
europa+eu+int0futurum0constitution0&+ Accessed 22 June 2005+
10+ See Duchêne 1994; and Pollack 2003+
11+ Caporaso 2000+
12+ See Finnemore 1996; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Linden 2002; and Risse, Ropp, and Sik-
kink 1999+
13+ See Checkel 2003; Checkel, this volume; and Johnston 2001+
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Socialization refers to the process of inducting individuals into the norms and
rules of a given community+14 The mechanisms by which this occurs may range
from the self-conscious ~for example, normative suasion! to the subconscious ~for
example, social mimicking or role playing!, and from the instrumental ~for exam-
ple, shaming! to the noninstrumental ~for example, communication!+15
Socialization demands that individuals change their preferences in accordance
with organizational norms+ This poses a challenge for analysis because prefer-
ences cannot be observed from behavior+ Preferences need to be researched directly,
for example in structured interviews, to yield information that is independent from
behavior+ This research strategy is time-consuming, and even then, uncertainty lin-
gers about the veracity of stated preferences+ Respondents may lie, or they may
not be able to express their true preferences+16 That is perhaps why social scien-
tists treat preferences as exogenous+17
International socialization is present to the degree that individuals in an inter-
national organization support its mission as a result of experiences in the organi-
zation+ One must diagnose a change in a person’s mental state to show that norms
have been internalized—Type II socialization, in Checkel’s terms+18 What ques-
tions should one ask to uncover the scope conditions of international socialization?
• How do organizational experiences shape preferences over time? Is induc-
tion into organizational norms easier and faster for newcomers than for long-
time members? Are younger recruits more likely to be socialized than older
ones? How, in other words, does the rate of socialization vary over time?
• How does organizational fragmentation affect socialization? Socialization
theory predicts that cohesive organizations are better at socializing agents
than fragmented organizations+
• How does international socialization interact with national socialization?
Individuals in international organizations usually come from diverse
national backgrounds+ When do national backgrounds reinforce, and when
do they weaken, international socialization?
14+ See Checkel, this volume; Conover 1991; and Hooghe 2002+
15+ See Beck and Jennings 1991; Johnston 2001; Risse 2000; and Sears and Valentino 1997+
16+ Deception and attitude softness can be problematic among ordinary citizens, as public opinion
research has demonstrated+ Zaller 1992+ Attitude softness, however, is rarely an issue for elites whose
views tend to be more crystallized on political objects+ Jennings 1992+ There is no fire-proof method
for distinguishing true from deceptive preferences+ I cannot discount the possibility that some respon-
dents concealed their true preferences, though the circumstances of the interview ~anonymity, volun-
tary participation, nonsensitive character of the questions!, and the senior status of the respondents
~considerable discretion, weak peer control! are reassuring+
17+ In international relations, rationalists tend to take preferences as exogenous, while constructiv-
ists endogenize them+ However, as Fearon and Wendt remind us, it is unwise to exaggerate the differ-
ence+Whether one endogenizes preferences is an analytical choice dictated by one’s research question+
See Fearon and Wendt 2003, 64+ Preferences are the first step, and behavior the second step, in the
two-step dance that is international cooperation+ Legro 1996+
18+ Checkel, this volume+
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• Can one splice the effects of socialization from alternative processes that
induce support for organizational norms? To accurately assess whether
support is due to socialization, one must control for self-selection, selective
recruitment, and utility maximization+
• Does the effectiveness of socialization vary across beliefs? An
organization’s mission usually consists of multiple norms+ Are some norms
more open to socialization than others?
How Do Organizational Experiences Shape Preferences
over Time?
Inculcating values is a gradual process: the longer one’s involvement in an orga-
nization, the more one’s beliefs can be expected to approximate that organization’s
norms+19 While socialization usually requires long-term exposure, some individu-
als need less time than others+ Thus the rate at which individuals internalize indi-
vidual norms varies+
Effect of novelty. Initial experiences are more influential than subsequent ones+
People in a new situation ~that is, newcomers! are likely to be disoriented and
eager to conform+ They are more susceptible to efforts of persuasion, and more
disposed to copy what others do+20 As time goes by, views crystallize, that is, they
become more consistent and stable+21 The marginal effect of time spent in an orga-
nization is illustrated in Figure 1, where the slope of the line AA' flattens as it
approaches t1+
Primacy. Socialization varies inversely with a person’s age and experience+ This
is the primacy effect+ Psychologists theorize that new experiences stick best when
a person has few relevant prior experiences+22 There is debate about the optimal
age for socialization and the extent to which older people become impervious to
socialization+ But even those who argue that core predispositions continue to crys-
tallize well past adolescence accept that change takes place ever more slowly with
age+23 One should therefore find that young recruits and people with minimal rel-
evant prior experience—blank slates, or “baby generals” as Gheciu calls them—
are more susceptible to socialization than seasoned members+24 Young recruits and
19+ Searing 1986+
20+ See Johnston 2001; also Checkel 2003+
21+ Sears and Funk 1999+
22+ See Sears and Levy 2003; and Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976+
23+ Sears and Funk 1999+
24+ Gheciu, this volume+ Novice and primacy effects are sometimes conflated, but they are analyt-
ically different+ While the primacy effect is a function of age, the novice effect is a function of time
spent in an organization+
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“blank slates” are represented in Figure 2 by the steep curve AA'', while older
recruits0experienced individuals are represented by the flatter curve AA'''+
These considerations temper one’s expectations about the strength of socializa-
tion in international organizations+ Few officials join international organizations
FIGURE 1. Mapping socialization
FIGURE 2. Socialization, utility, self-selection
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as young adults, top functions are often filled through lateral appointments of
national diplomats or experts, and personnel turnover tends to be high+ To the
extent that recruits are older, experienced, or mobile, I hypothesize that the social-
ization curve will be flattened or truncated+
How Does Organizational Fragmentation Affect Socialization?
Organizations are rarely unitary+ Compartmentalization multiplies opportunities for
socialization, but it also produces diversity within an organization+ Compartmen-
talization intensifies ties within organizational subunits while loosening those among
them+ Because members’ experiences are usually more intense in organizational
subunits, socialization is likely to be more effective there+
However, different subunits within an organization may socialize different norms,
some of which may reinforce the international organization’s mission, and others
not+ The socialization curve will be steeper when socialization in the unit reinforces
the norms of the organization as a whole, and flatter when it does not+
Fragmentation is a trademark of many organizations, both international and
national, especially when political leadership is weak or divided+ In his seminal
article on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison emphasizes how weak presidential
leadership fostered bureaucratic fragmentation+When a bureaucracy is divided, he
argues, bureaucrats are inclined to identify with their department’s interest over
and above that of the administration as a whole+25
How Does International Socialization Interact
with National Socialization?
Most individuals are members of several organizations and are therefore exposed
to competing norms, but the extent to which exposure leads to socialization depends
on the boundedness of the organization+ An organization is bounded to the extent
that it controls its members,26 and in the last analysis, its members’ life chances+
Boundedness requires authority—over the mission of the organization, how it is
to be pursued, and who should pursue it+
The relative boundedness of international organizations is usually constrained
by national institutions+ National institutions tend to have deeper historical roots,
a more coherent mission, more extensive resources, and more cohesive member-
ship than international organizations+ The institutions of one’s country of birth also
tend to be most influential in pre-adulthood+27 Children know whether they are
American, German, or French by the age of six or seven;28 they acquire basic
25+ Allison 1971+
26+ Nordlinger 1981+
27+ See Jennings and Stoker 2001; and Sears and Levy 2003+
28+ Druckman 1994+
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beliefs about democracy, freedom, community, race, and rudimentary political alle-
giance and partisanship during adolescence+ These political beliefs are cued by
schools, parents, churches, media, associations, and peer groups in a particular
national environment+ Even in the age of globalization, nearly all individuals in
Western societies grow up in one or, at most, two national states+ So an inter-
national official’s nationality comes with distinctive cultural baggage+
One should not assume that national institutions always dilute international
norms+ National institutions may actually deepen multilateral or supranational val-
ues+ National and international socialization may produce the same outcome, and
only an analysis sensitive to alternative contexts can disentangle these+
How might national context predispose individuals in one direction or another
with respect to international norms? Countries vary widely in the degree to which
they centralize or decentralize authority+ Notwithstanding the United States and
Switzerland, citizens of federal societies may have fewer inhibitions concerning
supranationalism and multilevel governance+
Political parties constitute a second context for political socialization, and this
is especially so with respect to the EU+ European integration has become an issue
that divides political parties and electorates+29 To the extent that international offi-
cials identify with a political party ideology, one would expect this to influence
their views on international norms+ Finally, I expect an individual’s prior work
experiences to matter+ I anticipate that those whose career has led them abroad are
more sympathetic to international norms+ In contrast, individuals who have worked
exclusively in their national civil service have been socialized to place the highest
value on public service to their nation+
Can One Distinguish Socialization from Self-Selection
and Selective Recruitment?
Socialization is only one of several processes that connect individuals to groups+
Even if those who work in an organization support its norms, this may not be
because of socialization+ The alternatives are threefold+ Members may share an
organization’s norms because those who choose to join the organization are already
supportive ~self-selection!, because the organization screens recruits for their views
~selective recruitment!, or because self-interest induces employees to share the
organization’s norms ~utility maximization!+
Self-selection and selective recruitment precede socialization; they do not say
anything about whether people are socialized once they join the organization+ Hence,
they do not affect the shape of the socialization curve, but they do affect the point
29+ See Evans 2002; and Marks and Steenbergen 2004+
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of departure—in Figure 2, they shift the intercept of the socialization curve north
along the y axis+30
Can One Distinguish Socialization from Utility Maximization?
Socialization theory states that individuals acquire preferences by internalizing
norms embodied in the groups or institutions in which they live or work, or which
are otherwise important to them+ This view emphasizes affective group ties
~identities! and long-standing personal dispositions+ What motivates individuals
is, in March and Olsen’s words, “a logic of appropriateness+” 31 Utility theory,
in contrast, maintains that preferences reflect self-interest, usually conceived in
materialistic terms+ Individuals have particular preferences because this is rational
in light of costs and benefits+ March and Olsen describe this as a “logic of
consequentiality+” 32
In many activities, individuals are motivated by some combination of identity
and utility+33 But the extent to which each is present varies from issue to issue,
and from context to context+ The question is not simply whether socialization or
utility maximization determines the preferences of members of international orga-
nizations, but under what conditions members tend to be more influenced by one
or the other+
Splicing socialization from utility maximization demands careful surgery+ Social-
ization, in contrast to utility maximization, is all about the temporal effects of
group influence+ The socialization curves in Figure 2 are time-sensitive in that
they tap cumulative experience in an organization+ Utility maximization is time-
insensitive: what matters are the incentives and disincentives that confront a per-
son at a given moment ~UU ' in Figure 2!+34
Socialization theory hypothesizes that individuals have a psychological need to
minimize inconsistent beliefs+ Cognitive dissonance reduction, the psychological
mechanism whereby individuals seek to reduce dissonance among various beliefs,
30+ The distinction between self-selection and selective recruitment, on the one hand, and socializa-
tion, on the other, is hard to pin down empirically+ What would be useful is data that allow a) compar-
ison of the preferences of self-selected individuals with those of potential candidates who chose not to
apply, and b) comparison of the preferences of selected applicants with those of rejected applicants+
31+ March and Olsen 1989, 160+
32+ Ibid+
33+ See Chong 2000; Hooghe 2002; and Searing 1994+
34+ Over the long haul, it is often a combination of utility and socialization that brings an individual
to support organizational norms+ Initially, when a person joins an organization, incentives, persuasion,
and mimicking may all nudge them toward particular preferences, so that it is impossible to distin-
guish socialization from utility+ In the long run, individuals may internalize norms+ The litmus test is
whether preferences change in tandem with changing material incentives+ If they do, utility maximiza-
tion guides preference formation; if they do not, it is socialization+ I thank Don Searing for raising the
issue of changing processes of preference formation over time+ See also Johnston, this volume+
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decreases information costs and thus preempts rational calculation+35 An individ-
ual is more capable of reducing dissonance when the norm concerns diffuse val-
ues, and when the material stakes are low+ I take a look at these in turn+
Large and diffuse norms. Socialization is more likely for norms that concern
large or diffuse values in life+36 Rational choice, on the other hand, “is more pow-
erful when applied to medium-sized problems like the purchase of a car or of a
house+” But “large problems, in which the choice can be expected to have wide-
ranging consequences + + + tend to fall outside the scope of the theory+ Preference
rankings over big chunks of life tend to be incomplete, and subjective probabili-
ties over events in the distant future tend to be unreliable+” 37
Material stakes. Utility maximization prevails when norms are perceived to
have material consequences that can be estimated with some accuracy, are large
enough to matter, and when a person’s choice will probably affect the outcome+38
Materialist content, transparency, large stakes, and personal impact correspond to
central assumptions of rational choice concerning self-interest, information, and
motivation+ Utility maximization, then, is most likely to trump socialization when
an individual’s career chances are at stake+39
International norms that affect career chances or material outcomes, such as
norms concerning tasks, work practices, and constituency relations, are more open
to utility maximization+ International norms that concern diffuse values, such as
norms on international cooperation, multilateralism, supranationalism and inter-
governmentalism, are more readily socialized+
I have theorized how individual characteristics, organizational variables, and
type of norm affect socialization+ Table 1 summarizes these+ I now examine whether
and how the European Commission socializes those who work in it+
Socialization in the European Commission
I draw on two surveys of senior permanent civil servants in the European Com-
mission: director-generals, deputy director-generals, directors, senior advisors, and
heads of cabinet+ The first survey consists of semi-structured personal interviews
averaging eighty minutes in length, which I conducted between July 1995 and Feb-
ruary 1997+ The same individuals answered thirty-six questions concerning their
attitudes on EU and Commission-related topics+ From September 2001 through Feb-
ruary 2002, I mailed to all senior Commission officials a structured questionnaire
35+ See Chong 2000; and Simon 1985+
36+ See Goren 2001; Huddy 2003; and Taber 2003+
37+ Elster 1990, 40+
38+ See Elster 1990; Sears and Funk 1991; and Young et al+ 1991+
39+ See Chong 2000; Crano 1997; Sears 1993; and Taber 2003, 447– 48+
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replicating most of the 1995–97 questions+ I also conducted short personal inter-
views with fifteen respondents in February 2002+ Here I analyze responses to the
two sets of closed-ended mail questionnaires, illustrated with direct quotations from
transcribed interviews+40 Of a population of 204 and 230 senior Commission offi-
40+ The value of closed-ended mail questionnaires for elite research is debated+ Politically sophis-
ticated actors tend to dislike closed-ended questions because it forces them to condense complex beliefs
into blunt agree0disagree statements, while an interview allows them to be more subtle+ In his elite
study, Putnam reprints a letter from a British parliamentarian who makes this point+ See Putnam 1973,
19+ Likewise, I received a questionnaire from one official on which he had scribbled dense critical
comments next to virtually every question but refused to take position on a single item! In their study
of foreign policy makers, Hollis and Smith argue for taking accounts by elite actors seriously: “Our
actors interpret information, monitor their performance, reassess their goals+ The leading idea is that
of reasoned judgment, not of manipulation” ~emphasis in the original!+ See Hollis and Smith 1986,
283, quoted in Searing 1991, fn+17+ How can one make closed-ended questionnaires serve this pur-
pose? A first step is to draw heavily on previous research+ Where feasible, I replicated content and
format from Searing’s study of British parliamentarians and Putnam’s study of political elites+ See
Searing 1994; and Putnam 1973, respectively+ This has the added value of comparability+ Furthermore,
I systematically pretested the questionnaire+ Finally, I triangulated statistical analysis of the closed-
ended elite questionnaires with qualitative reading of in-depth interviews+ Personal interviews with
137 senior Commission officials produced 180 hours of taped interviews, so respondents had plenty of
TABLE 1. Scope and mechanisms of socialization
Independent variable Hypothesis
Individual characteristics
time in organization Socialization is most intense for newcomers and decreases
over time+
primacy ~age when joining! Inexperienced recruits are more rapidly socialized+
self-selection Self-selected recruits are more likely to support organizational
norms+
Organizational variables
organizational fragmentation Fragmentation inhibits unitary socialization+
organizational boundedness The more bounded the organization, the more effectively it
socializes+
control over recruitment Organizationally selected recruits are more likely to support
organizational norms+
incentives ~sanctions and rewards! Incentives may induce support for organizational norms
through utility maximization+
Type of norm
substantive scope of issue Large0diffuse issues facilitate socialization+
size of material stakes Transparent0sizeable material stakes facilitate utility
maximization+
stability of norm Unstable norms discourage preference structuring:
socialization and utility maximization are weakened+
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cials at the respective time points, 105 responded in 1996 and 93 in 2002+41 When
question wording is consistent across surveys, I pool data, and this brings the sam-
ple to 198+
It is useful to establish a baseline for comparison+ How do the views of top
Commission officials on European integration compare with those of other actors?
One knows an increasing amount about preferences by EU actors, including the
Council of Ministers,42 permanent representations,43 European parliamentarians,44
Commission officials, national civil servants,45 national governments,46 national
political parties,47 interest groups,48 and public opinion+49 But surveys often ask
different questions+
Fortunately, there are some common points for comparison+ An oft-repeated
Eurobarometer question asks citizens how they want to distribute authority between
the EU and national governments on thirteen individual policies+ The same ques-
tion was included in the 1996 national elite survey on attitudes concerning Euro-
pean integration, the only systematic survey of national elites to date in the fifteen
pre-enlargement EU member states+50 I also used the question in my 2002 survey
of top Commission officials+51
time to explicate their views ~in French or English!+ Closed-ended questionnaires were handed out
after the interview+ The idea is to maximize the distinctive advantage of closed-ended questionnaires—an
objective, quantifiable basis for systematic comparison—while minimizing their disadvantages+
41+ The higher response rate for the first survey ~51 percent against 40 percent! reflects the fact that
the personal interview had allowed me to establish rapport with the respondent+ When necessary, I
followed up by phone, e-mail, or fax+ In 2001–2002, the procedure was more distant+ A research assis-
tant mailed questionnaires ~in French and English! to 230 officials, but struggled to meet our target
response rate+ I wound up traveling to Brussels to set up fifteen short appointments, in which I asked
respondents to fill out the questionnaire in my presence+ I took care not to influence the process to
ensure comparability with the mailed-in responses+ The flying visit provided me with an opportunity
for brief personal interviews+ Facts and figures on response rate, sample bias, and interview strategy
for the first survey are available in Hooghe 2002, and from my Web site at ^http:00www+unc+edu0
;hooghe0&+
42+ Beyers, this volume+
43+ Lewis, this volume+
44+ Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten 2004+
45+ Egeberg 1999+
46+ Hug and König 2002+
47+ Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards forthcoming+
48+ Wessels 2004+
49+ See Gabel and Anderson 2002; and Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004+
50+ The public opinion data are from Eurobarometer 54+1 of fall 2000+ Hartung 2001+ The national
elite data were collected in 1996 by EOS Gallup-Europe, which drew a representative sample from a
database of 22,000 individuals from five elite sectors: elected politicians ~national and European par-
liamentarians!, senior national civil servants, business and trade union leaders, media leaders ~includ-
ing heads of broadcast and print media!, and cultural elites ~persons playing a leading role in the
academic, cultural, or religious life!+ The survey was conducted by telephone ~N 3778!+ See Spence
1996+
51+ Question 30 in Eurobarometer 54+1 reads: “For each of the following areas, do you think that
decisions should be made by the @nationality# government, or made jointly within the European Union?
1 nationality, 2 jointly within the European Union, 3 don’t know+” Hartung 2001+ The question
formulation for national elites and Commission officials differs somewhat from that for public opin-
ion, in that it allows respondents to indicate support or opposition on a scale from 1 to 10+ For com-
parability, elite data must therefore be transformed into a dichotomous variable+ See Hooghe 2003+
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Top Commission officials appear significantly more pro-European than either
national elites or public opinion across the thirteen policies for which we have
comparable data+52 Average support among Commission officials is 65 percent,
against 56 percent for national elites, and 53 percent for the public+
This pro-European bias is reflected in perceptions of identity ~see Table 2!+When
Eurobarometer asks citizens to signal how much they are attached to their country
and how much to Europe, European attachment is no match for national attach-
ment, as the averages in the last column show+ National attachment has a signifi-
cantly smaller lead among top Commission officials+ Top Commission officials
are also much less likely to characterize their identity as exclusively national than
52+ Hooghe 2003+ The thirteen policies are currency, humanitarian aid0Third World, foreign policy,
immigration and asylum, environment, agriculture, defense, research and development, regional pol-
icy, employment, social inclusion, health policy, and education+ Of the twenty-six one-way analysis-
of-variance means tests for group differences—thirteen are between Commission officials and public
opinion, and thirteen are between Commission officials and national elites—twenty are significant at
the +001 level, one at the +01 level, one at the +05 level, and only four are insignificant ~ p . +05!+ The
results are robust across the Bonferroni and Tukey methods+
TABLE 2. National and European identity among Commission officials
and the public
National attachment
Not at all
attached
Not very
attached
Fairly
attached
Very
attached
Don’t
know
Average on
4-point scale
Public 1+4% 8+0% 38+1% 51+7% 0+7% 3+4*
Commission 3+3% 10+9% 46+7% 39+1% 0% 3+2*
European attachment
Not at all
attached
Not very
attached
Fairly
attached
Very
attached
Don’t
know
Average on
4-point scale
Public 9+4% 27+4% 41+7% 18+1% 3+4% 2+7**
Commission 2+2% 19+4% 50+5% 24+7% 1+1% 3+0**
European or national identity
European
only
European
and
national
National
and
European
National
only
Don’t
know/
refuse
Average on
4-point scale
Public 3+4% 5+8% 45+3% 42+4% 3+1% 3+3**
Commission 2+2% 43+0% 38+7% 0% 16+1% 2+4**
Note: Scales range from 1 ~not at all attached; European only! to 4 ~very attached; national only!+ The last column
reports difference of means tests, whereby **p , +001; *p , +05+ The public opinion data are from Hartung 2001,
N  16,061; data for Commission officials are from the author’s survey in 2002, N  93+
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are ordinary citizens+ Forty-three percent of citizens describe themselves as “national
only,” but not a single official in the sample is so inclined+53
To summarize, Commission officials are more likely to identify with Europe
and are more in favor of shifting policy to the European level than national elites
or citizens+ There is, then, considerable support among top Commission officials
for the Commission norm of supranationalism+ Is this because the Commission
has socialized its officials, or for other reasons?
What Explains Commission Officials’ Views
on Supranationalism?
Table 3 presents a multivariate ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression explaining
top officials’ preferences on supranationalism, which is measured by two items
tapping whether member states or supranational institutions should be central pil-
lars of EU governance ~see Appendix 1 for wording and statistics!+
To estimate accurately the effect of international and Commission socialization,
one must control for socialization outside the Commission and for utility+ Table 3
reports that Commission socialization ~measured as length of service in the Com-
mission! and international socialization ~measured as having studied abroad! are
not significant+54 In contrast, variables that capture socialization outside the Com-
mission ~that is, experience in a federal vs+ unitary political system, ideology, and
prior experience in a national administration! are highly significant+ Utility maxi-
mization ~that is, national economic benefit! also has a significant effect+ Officials
from countries that are net beneficiaries from EU policies are more likely to be
supranationalist+
Figure 3 illustrates the relative effect of these variables+ The solid boxes encom-
pass the interquartile range and the whiskers indicate the 5th to the 95th percen-
tiles, holding all other independent and control variables at their means+ For
example, an individual at the 5th percentile on federalism has a score of 3+8 on
supranationalism on a 1–7 scale, and an individual at the 95th percentile scores
5+7+ The variables toward the left of Figure 3 have the largest effect across their
interquartile range+ The three most powerful variables relate to socialization out-
side, rather than within, the Commission+ International education and length of
service in the Commission are considerably weaker, as is utility maximization+ I
now take a closer look+
53+ The question is: “In the near future, do you see yourself as ~1! @nationality# only, ~2! @national-
ity# and European, ~3! European and @nationality#, or ~4! European only?” Note that 16 percent of top
officials ~against 3+1 percent of the public! refused to choose one or the other option+ Follow-up ques-
tions show that some officials object to having to rank European and national identity+
54+ The argument for including international education is that it reinforces transnational norms, as
students abroad are exposed to different ways of thinking and living+ This happens during young adult-
hood when the primacy effect is powerful+ Foreign students also experience firsthand that expatriates
have limited citizenship rights compared to nationals at home, and I expect this to strengthen support
for supranational institutions that could create overarching rights+
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How Do Commission Experiences Shape Preferences
Over Time?
The effect of Commission socialization is modest: an additional year of service
increases supranational support by 0+014 on a seven-point scale+ At this rate, and
controlling for the factors in Table 3, it would take seventy-one years to see some-
one who begins to work in the Commission as a neutral ~four on our seven-point
scale! change into a mild supranationalist at five+
But this conclusion does not hold for all Commission officials+ The effect of
Commission socialization is considerably stronger for the seventy-eight officials
who joined the organization before their thirtieth birthday—the primacy group
~see Table 3, second column!+55 The relative weight of international and national
socialization is reversed+ The effect of length of service is outweighed only by
party ideology, and it is considerably stronger than federalism, national career,
and country size+ Each additional year of Commission service increases support
by 0+077 on a seven-point scale+ So “baby generals” need some thirteen years to
change from a neutral four on the supranationalism scale to a mild prosupranation-
alist position of five+ Commission socialization is concentrated among this group+
55+ Severe multicollinearity precludes testing the primacy effect in a single equation with overall
Commission socialization ~length of service!+
TABLE 3. Explaining supranationalism
All officials Primacy group
Constant 4+381 ~+655!** 4+313 ~1+253!**
International socialization
length of service in commission 0+014 ~+014! 0+077 ~+032!*
international education 0+156 ~+121! 0+262 ~+193!
Socialization outside Commission
state structure (dispersed vs. unitary):
federalism 0+187 ~+042!** 0+077 ~+083!
size of country 0+012 ~+005!* 0+013 ~+009!
ideology 0+110 ~+075!8 0+345 ~+139!*
years in national administration 0+031 ~+019!8 0+070 ~+103!
Utility factors
power-dg utility 0+033 ~+058! 0+003 ~+098!
national economic benefit 0+180 ~+121!8 0+300 ~+363!
R2 0+226 0+240
Adjusted R2 0+182 0+111
N 198 78
Note: Ordinary least squares ~OLS! are used in models for all officials and for the primacy group+ The dependent
variable ~preferences on supranationalism! and the independent variables are detailed in Table A1 of Appendix 1+
Coefficients are unstandardized+ Standard errors are in parentheses+ OLS regression analyses with pairwise deletion+
Significance at **p , +01; *p , +05; 8p , +15;+
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There is no support for the hypothesis that newcomers are more susceptible to
socialization, or that the rate of socialization decreases with years of exposure+56
The marginal effect of an additional year in the Commission is more or less linear
with respect to time served+
Newcomers in the European Commission try hard to understand the rules and
norms in their new organization+ However, understanding rules is one thing, being
persuaded by them is another+ As one recently appointed Italian top official put it:
“This is a huge organization, and when you arrive the first thing you do is to try to
understand what is going on in the house+ Of course, I do have, let’s say, my own
prejudices in this area and I did give some messages, but in the beginning most of
the effort is in understanding+” An Austrian top civil servant, six months on the job,
echoed this+ When asked whether she had the sense, in the first few weeks, that
she would be able to pursue her goals, she replied: “My main interest was to fully
56+ I tested this in several ways+ I defined newcomers as those with up to two, up to three, up to five
or up to seven years of service+ Under no conditions is the difference between their rate of socializa-
tion and that of seasoned officials significant+ I also tested several nonlinear permutations of length of
service; none is superior to linearity+
FIGURE 3. Effects of independent variables
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capture what was going on and how it functioned—taking stock of things and how
things were done+” The prevailing attitude among newcomers appears to be to wait
and see, and not, as one might expect, mimicking behavioral norms of the group+
Socialization is not helped by the fact that Commission rules and norms are
often difficult to grasp+ Several Commission officials whom I interviewed vividly
recalled their bewilderment in coming to grips with the complex interplay between
multicultural attitudes and national particularities, the charged politicking in an
apparent bureaucratic organization, the paper bureaucracy which all condone but
few take seriously, and the paradox of widespread informal networking in a for-
malistic hierarchy+ This complexity undercuts normative transparency and inhibits
socialization+ Learning to circumvent formal norms is essential to survival+ An
official who worked his way up in the Commission to the absolute top summa-
rizes the duplicitous character of work norms:
The Commission only works when hierarchy is put aside+ While we respect
the hierarchy in formal terms, we know that, to get this job done, we need to
ask the question: “Who do we need to do it?”+ + + We are task-oriented, per-
son oriented+ That requires a great deal of flexibility and adaptability+ It’s not
possible to operate, except through an at best token acceptance of procedures
and hierarchies+ The only way to make this thing work effectively within the
deadlines set by politics is by relying on key people committed to the same
goal+ In a private organization, you have blanket indoctrination of everyone
concerned into the goals of whatever you are producing, whether it is a
production program or the launching of a new product or a new financial
exercise, every single person goes through something akin to a propaganda
exercise+ This does not happen in the Commission+ You have to form infor-
mal coalitions + + + allies in the cause of a particular advancement of the pol-
icy from here to there+”
Does Organizational Fragmentation Affect Socialization?
It is conventional wisdom that bureaucratic fragmentation in the Commission
encourages local cultures,57 and one would expect this to influence Commission
socialization+ Coombes, an early student of the Commission, described the Com-
mission as a collection of feudal fiefdoms+58 Cram conceives of the European
Commission as a multi-organization, where subunits have their own goals and oper-
ational style+59 Since the late 1980s, the Commission bureaucracy has also been
scattered over some thirty-five buildings across Brussels, while in the old days
many worked within walking distance of the Commission headquarters in the Ber-
laymont building on Schuman square+ Spatial separation is said to have reinforced
a culture of fiefdoms+
57+ See Page 1997; and Shore 2000+
58+ Coombes 1970+
59+ Cram 1994+
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If the Commission is as fragmented as many observers and some policymakers
claim it is, directorates with extensive supranational competences and discretion-
ary budgets should be more effective in instilling supranational norms+ This is not
the case+60
The explanation appears to be mobility+ Mobility hinders identification with a
particular unit+ In the mid- to late 1990s, the average time a top official spent in a
particular top position was less than five years+ Consider these statistics: of the
people I interviewed in 1996, more than half had left the European Commission
by September 2001, and 25 percent had changed departments+ With a turnover
rate among top officials of 75 percent over five years, there is not much time to
mold individual preferences according to particular departmental cultures+ After
the Santer Commission resigned in 1999 over allegations of fraud, mismanage-
ment, and nepotism, the newly appointed commissioner for personnel, Neil Kin-
nock, required top officials to change posts every five to seven years+61 Contrary
to common beliefs, only a small group of top officials is entrenched in a depart-
mental world+ Kinnock’s mobility rules merely formalized common practice+
High rates of interdepartmental mobility should privilege overarching Commis-
sion norms+ Interdepartmental coordination, which compels top officials to clear
their departmental policies with other departments, should reinforce this+ The apex
of this elaborate coordination network consists of weekly meetings of director-
generals, where interdepartmental Commission business is settled+
Limits to the Commission’s Boundedness:
National Socialization
Table 3 strongly supports the contention that national socialization may be more
effective than international socialization in shaping international officials’ prefer-
ences+ National socialization appears double-edged, as noted by authors in this
issue+ On the one hand, national socialization depresses support for supranational-
ism among former national civil servants+ On the other, national socialization engen-
ders support for international norms+ The best predictor of top officials’ support
for supranationalism is whether they come from a federal country+ Core beliefs
about national governance shape preferences on European governance+ Federal-
ism divides sovereignty, and this notion underpins multilevel governance+62 Thus,
controlling for other factors, a Commission official who grew up in Belgium or
60+ For the 1996 sample, I calculate for each official the number of years he spent in departments
with extensive legal competences or a significant discretionary budget, and I call this variable power-
dg0socialization+ I also calculate the alternative utility hypothesis, i+e+, officials who happen to work
in a supranational department have career reasons to favor supranationalism, which is labeled power-
dg utility+ As the OLS regression in Table A in Appendix 2 illustrates, neither hypothesis bites+
61+ Kinnock made these measures public in a press statement on 29 September 1999+ Strictly speak-
ing, the new rules make rotation mandatory only for director-generals, but in practice, directors have
also been forced to rotate+ Author’s interview with a member of the Kinnock cabinet, February 2002+
62+ See Hooghe and Marks 2003; Keohane 2002; and Risse 2001+
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Germany is more favorably disposed to supranationalism than one raised in Brit-
ain or France+
Contexts outside the Commission are powerful+ The European Commission can-
not afford to be a bounded institution+ Shared authority is a vital feature of EU
decision making+ In few, if any, policy areas can one institution, national or Euro-
pean, take authoritative decisions unilaterally+63 The European system of multi-
level governance plugs top Commission officials into diverse institutional contexts+
It is necessary and natural for Commission officials to be attuned to national gov-
ernments, political parties, public opinion, and other EU institutions, as well as to
their international organization+
The pull of national contexts is consistent with the socialization literature+ Unlike
international organizations, national institutions—from families to schools to
governments—draw full advantage from the primacy effect+ European children
grow up in national contexts, and such contexts leave imprints that are hard to
dislodge later in life+
It is instructive to compare national civil servants with European Commission
officials+ National civil servants work for powerful national governments that rep-
resent imagined communities having concrete expression in national systems of
welfare or education, as well as bloc votes in the EU Council of Ministers+ The
notion of national public interest has a tangible core+64 European public interest is
shallower+ While the EU has acquired some trappings of nationhood—an anthem,
a flag, a public holiday, a European driver’s license, a European passport, a Euro-
pean currency, membership of international organizations—these symbols register
weakly in people’s minds+ Few outside the European institutions know that 9 May
is Europe’s “Independence Day+” The Euro is the single exception in terms of cap-
turing public attention, but its virtue is contested+65 National civil servants speak
for deeply rooted national communities, while Commission officials speak for a
potential community+66 The “gravitational pull” of the national often overwhelms
that of Europe, even for those who work in the Commission+ A long-serving top
official describes this astutely:
There is a clear difference between national administrations and the Commis-
sion+ National administrations have a broad consensus on objectives+All civil
servants are interested in pulling the same cart, and they know in which direc-
tion and when to pull the cart+ They may disagree about marginal adjust-
ments or speed, but they basically all agree on where they want to go and
what the national interest is+ To use the word “national interest” gives imme-
diately away why this cannot be the case inside the Commission+ Even though
we are supposed to work for the common interest of the Community, nobody
63+ See Hooghe and Marks 2001; and Pollack 2000+
64+ Page and Wright 1999+
65+ For many Europeans, it is associated with economic hardship, as its popular German nickname,
Euro-Teuro ~expensive Euro! illustrates+
66+ See Abélès and Bellier 1996; and Shore 2000+
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forgets his background, his nationality+ Much of the conflict between national
interests has been transferred to the Commission+ Some @officials# are almost
unashamed of it; they go straight for it and make it no secret+ Others—and I
think this is also a question of how long you have been in the Commission—
work much more for the common benefit+ They tend to take a rational-
reasoned balanced Community approach, whereas others choose a national-
interest approach+ So, national tensions are transferred to the Commission,
and that makes it impossible to have everybody agree ex ante on common
objectives+ There are no common objectives+ + + + This is still a relatively young,
expanding and maturing institution, which has not yet found its own identity+
What Is the Role of Self-Selection and Selective Recruitment?
Socialization is only one of several processes by which members of an organiza-
tion may come to support organizational norms+ In this section, I discuss how
self-selection and selective recruitment shape supranational preferences+ In the next
section, I demonstrate that material incentives help account for the views of top
Commission officials+
One knows that top Commission officials, including recent recruits, are more in
favor of shifting powers to the EU than either national elites or public opinion+
This may, in part, result from self-selection+ As the so-called engine of European
integration, it is likely that the Commission appeals to “believers+”
Evidence from interviews suggests that self-selection plays a role, but the effect
may be more limited than is often assumed+ When top officials are asked why
they joined the Commission, about one-quarter talk about European integration as
an ideal, which guarantees, or partially guarantees, peace, democracy, order, or
good governance+ As an older Dutch official explains, “I am a child of the war+
People of my generation would do anything to avoid a third world war+ We did
not have a sophisticated notion of an institutionalized Europe, but we were deeply
European because we never wanted to repeat that experience+” Officials from Spain,
Portugal, and Greece often mention that European integration helped consolidate
their young democracies+
However, most officials cite more pragmatic reasons for joining the Commis-
sion, including building a career ~39 percent!; national connections ~21 percent,
for example, their government asked them to apply!; connections in the policy
community ~21 percent, for example, they were approached when serving as
national experts in Council or Commission working groups!; party-political con-
nections ~8 percent!; or the desire for a policy challenge ~11 percent!+67 Overall,
then, most officials enter the Commission for other than idealistic reasons+ Self-
selection motivates only a minority+
67+ The percentages add up to more than 100 percent, because some officials mentioned two reasons+
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There is also limited evidence of pro-European selective recruitment+ Formal
recruitment rules allow the Commission to select officials on the basis of their
preferences if it so wishes+ The most supranational Commission president over
the past three decades, Delors, took these rules to heart: he searched for officials
who would press forward his supranational agenda+ According to Ross, “Delors,
with Pascal’s @Lamy, Delors’ chef de cabinet# advice, had very carefully replaced
a considerable number of high Commission officials, directors-general and divi-
sion heads, in critical areas+” 68 But there is no firm statistical support for this in
the data+ Although Delors recruits tended to be more supranational than those
recruited into top positions before or after Delors, the difference falls short of
significance+ There is no effect at all for the Santer or Prodi Commissions+69 The
Commission could, if it so chooses, influence its normative intake+ But it rarely
does so+
Can One Distinguish Socialization from Utility Maximization?
I have theorized that the effect of socialization depends on what is being social-
ized+ The more a Commission norm invokes diffuse or large values, the greater
the scope for socialization+ Utility maximization, by contrast, should be stronger
for norms that regulate tasks, work practices, and constituency relations—norms,
in other words, with immediate career implications+
In the introduction, I identified three norms that characterize the Commission’s
mission: supranationalism; Commission agenda setting; and autonomy from national
influence+ How do the effects of socialization and utility vary across these?
Supranationalism is a prime example of a diffuse norm+ It is nearly impossible
for top officials to anticipate how a more supranational European Union may affect
them professionally+ Supranationalism has ambiguous career implications+ On the
one hand, more supranationalism means more policy tasks and resources+ But on
the other, it implies upgrading the College of Commissioners to the government
of Europe, and this would imply downgrading permanent officials to mere civil
servants+ So one would expect socialization to be strong, and personal career util-
ity to be weak, in shaping officials’ norms regarding supranationalism+
Contrast this with the norm prescribing autonomy from national pressures+ This
is a norm with transparent implications for top officials’ careers+ Should the Com-
mission’s personnel system be strictly Weberian and reward merit over and above
nationality, or should it reflect national quotas? National quotas punish qualified
68+ Ross 1995, 67+
69+ I seek to capture the effect of selective recruitment by respective Commission presidents by
means of three dummies—one each for individuals appointed to top positions under Jacques Delors
~1986–94!, Jacques Santer ~1995–98!, and Romano Prodi ~1999–2002!+ The OLS regression in Table A5
in Appendix 2 shows that none of these effects is significant+
882 International Organization
candidates having the “wrong” nationality+ That is to say, officials from smaller
countries are disadvantaged because small countries have relatively few top slots
to fill, and so are officials who have not cultivated strong national connections
that could catapult them into national slots+ Contrast the fate of two respected
directors, one Dane and one Greek, interviewed in 1996+ The Dane’s ambition to
reach the summit—director-general—was dashed when a younger compatriot with
better political connections was promoted to the top slot reserved for Denmark+
The Greek director rated his chances for promotion as virtually nil because the
two Greek top-rank posts had recently been taken up+ Fast-forward to 2002, when
the Danish official had taken early retirement, while his Greek colleague was just
promoted+What had happened? The Commission resignation crisis in 1999 changed
the prospects for the Greek director when one of the two top Greeks was sacked
under a cloud of negligence and alleged fraud+ So, unexpectedly, a window of
opportunity opened briefly and then closed again+ A merit-based promotion sys-
tem, on the other hand, disadvantages candidates from recent member states, who
usually have less experience with the Commission’s way of working+ One would
therefore expect support for the norm of Commission autonomy to vary in tune
with utility considerations, such as the strength of national or political connec-
tions, the size of a country’s quota, or the timing of a country’s membership, while
socialization is expected to be weak+
Finally, one would expect support for the norm of Commission agenda setting
to be influenced by both socialization and utility+ This norm is diffuse in that it
embodies Monnet’s vision of the Commission as the engine of Europe; conse-
quently, it should be amenable to socialization+ But the norm also has calculable
implications for officials’ careers, in that it privileges a particular type of Com-
mission activity ~creating new policies! above another ~administering existing pol-
icies!; therefore, one would expect that utility calculations, informed by whether
they are vested in one or the other kind of activity, to matter as well+
Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c allow one to evaluate the relative effects of socialization
and utility on these norms+ Table 4a presents OLS models explaining variation
among Commission officials on the norm of supranationalism; Table 4b provides
the same for Commission agenda setting; and Table 4c presents models explaining
variation on the norm of autonomy from national influence+ Each table reports three
explanatory models for two time points, 1996 and 2002+70 The first two columns in
each table represent socialization variables; the following two columns represent
utility variables; the final two columns combine socialization and utility variables+
The coefficients of determination ~R2! at the bottom of each table estimate the
proportion of variance explained by each model+ Socialization has the greatest
causal weight for supranationalism ~Table 4a!; socialization is about evenly bal-
anced with utility maximization for Commission agenda setting ~Table 4b!; and in
70+ Appendix 3 hypothesizes causal effects and operationalizes variables+
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Table 4c, socialization is dwarfed by utility maximization for the norm of auton-
omy from national influences+ These results are consistent across time points, with
the exception of 2002 for the autonomy norm+
Furthermore, the results in Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c highlight a point made above:
socialization requires stable norms; utility maximization requires transparent incen-
tives+ Commission norms became less stable and less transparent after the resig-
nation of the Santer Commission in 1999, which happened in the face of allegations
TABLE 4a. Explaining supranationalism: Socialization versus utility
Socialization
model
Utility
maximization
model Full model
1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002
Constant 5+050 4+860 5+204 5+961 3+804 5+344
~1+388!** ~+801!** ~+952!** ~+743!** ~1+879!* ~1+045!**
Commission socialization
length of service 0+027 0+007 0+042 0+007
~+026! ~+015! ~+033! ~+016!
international 0+226 0+105 0+176 0+038
education ~+256! ~+120! ~+275! ~+136!
Socialization outside Commission
state structure
(dispersed vs. unitary):
federalism 0.176 0.141 0.182 0.150
(.078)* (.047)** (.081)* (.050)**
size of country 0+022 0+004 0+018 0+002
~+010!* ~+006! ~+011!8 ~+007!
ideology 0+150 0+062 0+120 0+042
~+151! ~+083! ~+154! ~+085!
years in national 0+032 0+023 0+032 0+024
administration (.036) (.020) (.038) (.021)
Utility factors
power-dg utility 0+089 0+075 0+122 0+092
~+079! ~+071! ~+102! ~+071!
national economic 0+117 0+041 0+225 0+086
benefit ~+161! ~+131! ~+228! ~+136!
national clubness 0+510 0+265 0+125 0+141
~+199!* ~+160!8 ~+300! ~+194!
parachutage 0+285 0+056 0+367 0+026
~+328! ~+262! ~+633! ~+316!
Control factor: gender 0+099 0+012 0+085 0+009 0+032 0+041
~+822! ~+417! ~+644! ~+419! ~+837! ~+423!
R2 0+234 0+150 0+091 0+038 0+276 0+182
Note: Ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression analyses with pairwise deletion+ The N is 105 for 1996 and 93 for
2002+ Dependent and independent variables are detailed in Appendix 3+ All models in this and the following tables
control for gender+ Significance at **p , +01; *p , +05; 8p , +15+
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of fraud, mismanagement, and nepotism+ The result is that top officials’ views in
2002 are markedly less structured than in 1996+ The 2002 data capture an organi-
zation in turmoil+ The crisis shattered consensus in the Commission around the
agenda-setting norm, which prescribes that the European Commission’s primary
TABLE 4b. Explaining views on Commission agenda setting:
Socialization versus utility
Socialization
model
Utility
maximization
model Full model
1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002
Constant 4+446 3+438 6+795 1+586 8+178** 2+313**
~1+633!** ~1+038!** ~2+426!** ~1+699!** ~3+414! ~1+941!
Commission socialization
length of service 0+021 0+020 0+024 0+007
~+025! ~+017! ~+031! ~+022!
international 0+076 0+136 0+118 0+202
education ~+323! ~+164! ~+325! ~+170!
Socialization outside
Commission
ideology 0+363 0+204 0+346 0+203
~+200!8 ~+119!8 ~+204!8 ~+124!8
national
administrative
tradition 1+156 0+507 0+865 0+245
weak weberian ~+945! ~+630! ~+973! ~+705!
0+272 0+412 0+462 0+245
strong weberian ~+747! ~+510! ~+780! ~+528!
private-sector 0+177 0+280 0+358 0+222
experience ~+656! ~+466! ~+661! ~+476!
Utility factors
national economic 0+001 0+181 0+114 0+204
benefit ~+196! ~+160! ~+269! ~+166!
administrative/mana- 0+381 0+373 0+317 0+347
gerial-dg utility ~+405! ~+344! ~+552! ~+367!
soft-dg utility 0+406 0+771 0+447 0+425
~+489! ~+503!8 ~+694! ~+573!
delors recruit 0+925 0+110 0+910 0+052
~+398!* ~+379! ~+542!8 ~+387!
age 0+054 0+024 0+054 0+023
~+037! ~+029! ~+058! ~+035!
Control factor: gender 1+096 0+841 0+605 0+765 0+920 0+848
~1+066! ~+593! ~+815! ~+562! ~1+116! ~+612!
R2 0+143 0+117 0+103 0+089 0+232 0+155
Note: Ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression analyses with pairwise deletion+ The N is 105 for 1996 and 93 for
2002+ Dependent and independent variables are detailed in Appendix 3+ Significance at **p , +01; *p , +05;
8p , +15+
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role is to initiate, not administer, EU policies ~see Table 4b!+ In 1999, a new Com-
mission team under Romano Prodi began rewriting internal work practices to
encourage “sound management,” and thus shifted the focus from policy creation
to management+ The crisis also forced the organization to face up to a duplicitous
personnel policy whereby the norm of autonomy from national influences ~see
Table 4c! was contradicted by the practice of national quotas in top appoint-
TABLE 4c. Explaining views on Commission autonomy:
Socialization versus utility
Socialization
model
Utility
maximization
model Full model
1996 2002 1996 2002 1996 2002
Constant 4+245 5+308 6+119 5+869 6+453 5+105
~+854!** ~+559! ~+880!** ~+618!** ~1+062!** ~+804!**
Commission socialization
length of service 0+020 0+008 0+020 0+022
~+017! ~+012! ~+024! ~+015!
international 0+089 0+035 0+109 0+111
education ~+206! ~+112! ~+190! ~+124!
Socialization outside Commission
national
administrative
tradition 1+316 0+726 0+586 0+561
weak weberian ~+607!* ~+417!8 ~+595! ~+494!
0+953 0+687 0+659 0+651
strong weberian ~+475!* ~+345!8 ~+465!8 ~+357!8
cabinet experience 0+546 0+131 0+503 0+086
~+368!8 ~+235! ~+327!8 ~+239!
Utility factors
parachutage 0+498 0+116 0+272 0+039
~+321!8 ~+250! ~+458! ~+283!
soft-dg utility 1+341 0+556 1+500 0+448
~+379!** ~+340!8 ~+389!** ~+381!
national clubness 0+881 0+175 0+816 0+226
~+186!** ~+140! ~+221!** ~+171!
national quota 0+137 0+055 0+075 0+080
~+058!** ~+044! ~+065! ~+048!8
Control factor: gender 0+345 0+404 0+393 0+526 0+222 0+450
~+683! ~+392! ~+607! ~+385! ~+611! ~+394!
R2 0+136 0+095 0+320 0+064 0+365 0+147
Note: Ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression analyses with pairwise deletion+ The N is 105 for 1996 and 93 for
2002+ Dependent and independent variables are detailed in Appendix 3+ Significance at **p , +01; *p , +05;
8p , +15+
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ments+71 The Commission responded by overhauling its personnel policy+ The new
policy rejects national quotas, favors merit and seniority, privileges internal pro-
motion over lateral appointments, lays down a code of impartial conduct, and
imposes mobility on the higher echelons+ The upshot is that, as long as the Com-
mission’s organizational mission is in flux, the Commission is in a weak position
to shape—either through socialization or through career incentives—top officials’
views on Commission norms+
Table 5 summarizes, then, how this empirical study of socialization in the Com-
mission bears on the theory+
Conclusion
International socialization is hardly a panacea for those interested in diffusing inter-
national norms+ The European Commission is surely among the most favorable
sites for socialization of international norms+ Yet the evidence suggests that Com-
mission and international socialization is considerably weaker than socialization
outside the Commission+
Why is international socialization weak? One reason is that international orga-
nizations rarely benefit from the primacy effect—the opportunity to influence
members in their young adult years+ The European Commission is an unusual inter-
national organization in that 35 percent of its top employees began to work in the
Commission in their twenties+ Commission socialization is almost exclusively con-
centrated in this group+ It is extremely difficult—nigh impossible—for an inter-
national organization to substantially shift the views of mature recruits+
71+ See Peterson 1999; and Ross 1995+
TABLE 5. Scope and mechanisms of socialization: Evidence
Hypothesis Evidence
Socialization is most intense for newcomers and decreases over time. Weak support
Inexperienced recruits are more rapidly socialized. Strong support
Self-selected recruits are more likely to support organizational norms. Moderate support
Fragmentation inhibits unitary socialization. Weak support
The more bounded the organization, the more effective in socializing. Strong support
Organizationally selected recruits are more likely to support organizational
norms.
Weak support
Explicit sanctions/rewards induce utility maximization, not socialization. Strong support
Large or diffuse issues facilitate socialization. Strong support
Transparent, sizeable material stakes facilitate utility maximization. Strong support
Unstable norms discourage preference structuring: socialization and
utility maximization are weakened.
Strong support
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A second reason for the weakness of international socialization is that inter-
national organizations lack control over their members’ life chances+ Socialization
flourishes in homogeneous, bounded environments; it is suppressed when an orga-
nization is fragmented and vulnerable to external influences+ The European Com-
mission is unusual in that it has more control over its members than all but a few
international organizations+ It has formal autonomy in recruiting and promoting
its personnel+ It has the authority to impose mobility on its officials to discourage
divergent bureaucratic subcultures+ It has extensive supranational powers and the
constitutional writ to insulate its work from national and other influences+ This is
fertile ground for instilling Commission norms+ However, the European Commis-
sion coexists with national institutions+ The Commission sets the agenda, but it
must engage the Council of Ministers, individual governments, and the European
Parliament in order to legislate+ Openness comes at a price: it diminishes the Com-
mission’s control over its officials, and induces these people to tap additional loy-
alties+ Hence, even in an international organization as powerful as the Commission,
one finds that national norms, originating in prior experiences in national minis-
tries, loyalty to national political parties, or diffuse national political socialization,
decisively shape top officials’ views on European norms+
One might turn the question around: Why is support for international norms so
strong? One conclusion of this study is that there is no intrinsic contradiction
between national and international norms+ The most powerful influences on pro-
European support among top officials are national or subnational+ National and
subnational socialization can, and do, produce support for international norms+
Supranationalism can also be generated by utilitarian incentives+ One knows
that material incentives can nudge state actors toward, or away from, international
norms,72 and I discern a similar logic at the micro level in the Commission itself+
But the causal power of material utility is limited+ Views about general principles
of international governance are influenced more by ideological predispositions and
conceptions of identity than by cost-benefit calculations+ This is explicable within
the paradigm of rational choice itself:When general governance norms are at issue,
the immediate material impact on individual lives tends to be obscure or, to the
extent it can be calculated, small+
Finally, there is some circumstantial evidence that self-selection nudges up sup-
port for Commission norms+ Indeed, individuals who choose to work in an inter-
national organization are likely to be favorably disposed to the organization’s norms+
There are, then, multiple paths through which preferences may be molded to
reflect international norms+ International socialization, in the sense of inducting
international norms within the organization itself, is one of them+ But in the cru-
cial case of the European Commission, international socialization is by no means
the most powerful+
72+ See Schimmelfennig, this volume; and Kelley 2004+
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Appendix 1
TABLE A1. Explaining supranationalism
Dependent variable
supranationalism Index of two equally weighted items ranging from 1 ~strongly opposed!
to 7 ~strongly in favor!: ~1! member states should be the central pillars
of the EU ~item reversed!; and ~2! Commission should be the
government of the European Union+
Independent variables
Socialization variables
length of commission
service (commission
socialization)
Years in Commission service+ Source: Biographical data from The
European Companion 1992, 1994; Euro’s Who’s Who 1991;
Commission press communications; and interviews by the author+
primacy effect An interaction term of years in Commission service and ~age 65 age
at time of entry!+
international
education
4-category variable whereby no international education  0, studied in
other European country  1, studied outside Europe  2, and studied in
other European country and outside Europe  3+ Source: Biographical
data and interviews+
federalism Extent of regional governance combining measures for constitutional
federalism, autonomy for special territories in the national state, the role
of regions in central government, and presence or absence of direct
regional elections+ Values range from 0 to 12, and reflect situation in
1990+ Values allocated to top officials according to home country+
Source: Hooghe and Marks 2001, app+ 2+
size of country Population size of home country of each senior Commission official+
Values in millions+
ideology For 1996: self-reported partisan affiliation, recoded into ideological
11-point left0right scale+ For 2002: self-reported 11-point left0right
ideological positioning+ Source: Hix and Lord 1997+
national
administration
Years in national service+ Only national state, not posting in Brussels+
Source: Biographical data and interview data+
Utility maximization variables
power-dg utility Composite index ranging from 0 to 9 of three measures: ~1! DG
discretion in regulation, measured as proportion of Commission
regulatory output without Council approval; ~2! DG discretion in
adjudication, measured as the absolute number of Court cases initiated
by a DG; and ~3! DG reputation from interviews with top officials
reporting three or four most powerful Commission DGs+ Source:
Hooghe 2002+
national
economic benefit
EU structural aid for 1994–99 as percentage of GDP for each member
state+ Source: European Commission 1996+ Percentage of GDP per
country+ Extrapolated to 2002+ Scores to officials by nationality+
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TABLE A2. Descriptive statistics
Name N Mean Median Min. Max. SD
supranationalism 198 4+61 4+75 1 7 1+49
length of service 198 18+71 20+00 1 41 10+38
primacy effect 196 618+51 608+00 7 1722 438+15
international education 196 0+73 0+00 0 3 0+97
federalism 198 4+30 4+00 0 10 3+08
size of country 198 40+44 57+00 0+40 79+30 25+92
ideology 152 5+24 5+00 1+50 9+30 1+50
years in national administration 198 5+48 1+00 0 29 7+23
power-dg utility 198 4+64 4+00 1 9 1+94
national economic benefit 198 0+68 0+25 0+11 3+98 1+04
TABLE A3. Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) supranationalism 1+00
(2) length of
service 0+16* 1+00
(3) primacy effect 0+13* 0+97** 1+00
(4) international
education 0+22** 0+01 0+00 1+00
(5) federalism 0+33** 0+22** 0+20** 0+16* 1+00
(6) size of country 0+01 0+40** 0+41**0+04 0+44** 1+00
(7) ideology 0+17* 0+03 0+07 0+05 0+16* 0+14 1+00
(8) years in national
administration 0+22**0+50**0+57**0+18*0+11 0+26** 0+11 1+00
(9) power-dg utility 0+04 0+00 0+00 0+05 0+06 0+00 0+02 0+02 1+00
(10) national
economic benefit 0+08 0+26**0+23** 0+17*0+28**0+39** 0+01 0+04 0+14*
Note: **p , +01; *p , +05+
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Appendix 2
TABLE A4. The effect of socialization in selective DGs (Power DG)
Constant 3+849 ~1+369!**
International socialization
length of service in commission 0+033 ~+027!
international education 0+215 ~+259!
power-dg socialization 0+003 ~+036!
Socialization outside Commission
state structure (pooled/unitary sovereignty):
federalism 0+188 ~+80!*
size 0+020 ~+010!8
ideology 0+132 ~+151!
years in national administration 0+030 ~+036!
Utility factors
power-dg utility 0+132 ~+116!
national economic benefit 0+030 ~+036!
R2 0+268
Adjusted R2 0+139
N 105
Note: Ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression for 1996 sample+ Coefficients are unstandardized+ Standard errors are
in parentheses+ OLS regression analysis with pairwise deletion+ **p , +01; *p , +05; 8p , +15+
TABLE A5. The effect of selective recruitment by Commission presidents
Constant 4+141 ~+748!**
International socialization
length of service in commission 0+017 ~+014!
international education 0+156 ~+122!
Socialization outside Commission
state structure (pooled/unitary sovereignty):
federalism 0+181 ~+043!**
size 0+012 ~+006!*
ideology 0+112 ~+078!8
years in national administration 0+028 ~+019!8
Utility factors
power-dg utility 0+033 ~+059!
national economic benefit 0+184 ~+123!8
Selective recruitment
delors recruit 0+287 ~+345!
santer recruit 0+168 ~+371!
prodi recruit 0+322 ~+463!
R2 0+230
Adjusted R2 0+169
N 198
Note: Ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression for pooled sample+ Coefficients are unstandardized+ Standard errors
are in parentheses+ OLS regression analysis with pairwise deletion+ **p , +01; *p , +05; 8p , +15+
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Appendix 3
TABLE A6. Views on supranationalism
Dependent variable
supranationalism Index of two equally weighted items ranging from 1 ~strongly opposed! to
7 ~strongly in favor!: ~1! member states should be the central pillars of the
EU ~item reversed!; and ~2! Commission should be the government of the
European Union+
Independent variables
Socialization variables: See Table A1+
Utility maximization variables: See Table A1 and the following.
national clubness H: The better one’s nationality is organized in Brussels, the more an official
has career incentives to support intergovernmentalism and oppose
supranationalism+ O: Index measuring degree of cohesion, organizational
resources, national government’s policy toward compatriots, and
Commission cabinet resources of nationalities in Brussels; the degree of
organization determines the effectiveness of nationalities in pushing career
interests of their compatriots+ Values are 1  weak, 2  medium, 3 
strong+ Source: Hooghe 2002+ Values allocated to officials by nationality+
parachutage H: A parachuted official is likely to support intergovernmentalism to pay
back the government that helped appoint him+ O: Dummy for official who
was externally appointed into a senior position+
Note: H  Hypothesis; O  Operationalization+
TABLE A7. Views on Commission agenda setting
Dependent variable
agenda setting Item: “Administration, management should be Commission priority
~item reversed!+” Ranges from 1 ~strongly opposed! to 7 ~strongly in
favor!+
(continued !
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TABLE A7. (Continued)
Independent variables
Socialization variables
commission socialization H: The longer an official has served in the Commission, the more
likely he internalizes support for Commission agenda setting+
O: See Table A1+
international education H: An internationally educated official is more likely to be
socialized into wanting maximal Commission agenda setting+
O: See Table A1+
ideology H: A left-oriented official is more likely to prefer Commission
agenda setting because it increases political regulation of the single
market+ O: See Table A1+
private-sector experience H: An official with private-sector managerial experience is more
likely to prefer a managerial Commission+ O: Dummy with value
of 1 if official had experience in industry or banking+
Source: Biographical data and interviews+
national administrative
tradition
H: An official socialized in Weberian administrative tradition is
more likely to prefer an agenda-setting Commission than an official
from a weak Weberian administration+ O: Dummies for
weak-Weberian, medium-Weberian, strong-Weberian+ Values
allocated by nationality to officials with national administrative
experience+ Source: Page 1995; and Page and Wright 1999+
Utility maximization variables
national economic
benefit
H: An official from a country that draws net benefits from the EU
has material incentives to prefer Commission agenda setting because
an active Commission is likely to deepen positive integration+ O:
See Table A1+
delors recruit H: An official appointed under Delors to run the internal market
program has career incentives to emphasize Commission
management+ O: Dummy with value of 1 if official was recruited to
top position under Commission president Jacques Delors+
Source: Biographical data+
age H: A younger official has career incentives to emphasize
Commission agenda setting+ O: Age of official at time of interview+
administrative/
managerial-dg utility
H: An official from an administrative-managerial DG has career
incentives to oppose Commission agenda setting+ O: Dummy taking
a value of 1 for officials in DGs with tasks that are primarily routine
administration, implementation or adjudication; consistent with the
definition of managerial roles by Page 1997+
soft-dg utility H: Officials from DGs with soft nonbudgetary power have career
incentives to prefer Commission agenda setting+ O: Dummy taking
a value of 1 for officials working in a DG concerned with policy
areas that use most frequently benchmarking, soft law, peer group
pressure, technical reporting, and other soft policy instruments+
Source: Interview data+
Note: H  Hypothesis; O  Operationalization+
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TABLE A8. Views on Commission autonomy from national influence
Dependent variable
commission autonomy Index of two equally weighted items tapping into views on national
quota, and on national dossiers+ The index ranges from 1 ~strongly
opposed! to 7 ~strongly in favor!+ Wording differs between 1996 and
2002+
Items in 1996: ~1! “It hurts Commission legitimacy that certain DGs
tend to be dominated by particular nationalities,” and ~2! “Too many
Commission officials let their nationality interfere with professional
judgments+”
Items in 2002: ~1! “Some argue that positions in the Commission
should be distributed across nationalities proportionate to respective
populations ~item reversed!,” and ~2! “Some think that it is preferable
to have dossiers of special interest to particular nationalities managed
by officials of those nationalities ~item reversed!+”
Independent variables
Socialization variables
commission socialization H: The longer an official has served the Commission, the more he
is likely to have internalized the norm of Commission autonomy+
O: See Table A1+
international education H: An internationally educated official is more likely to be socialized
into wanting autonomy from national influence+
O: See Table A1+
cabinet experience H: An official with cabinet experience is likely to appreciate the need
to work closely with nationals+ O: A dummy with the value of 1 if an
official has served in a Commission cabinet+
national administrative
tradition
H: An official who worked previously in a Weberian administration
prefers a Commission autonomous from national interest+
O: See Table A7+
Utility maximization variables
parachutage H: A parachuted official has career incentives to oppose Commission
autonomy from national influence+ O: See Table A6+
soft-dg utility H: An official from a soft DG has career incentives to cooperate with
national stakeholders, which leads to opposition of the Commission
norm+ O: See Table A7+
national clubness H: The better one’s nationality is organized in Brussels, the more an
official has career incentives to oppose Commission autonomy from
national influence+ O: See Table A6+
national quota H: An official from a country with a small quota has career incentives
to support Commission autonomy from national influence+ O: Number
of votes in the Council of Ministers, which is used in the Commission
as a proxy for determining national quota of Commission jobs+
Variable ranges between 2 and 10+ Scores allocated to officials by
nationality+
Note: H  Hypothesis; O  Operationalization+
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